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GLD-016        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2118 
 ___________ 
 
 AARON MICHAEL JONES, a/k/a Michael John Aaron Jones 
 
 v. 
 
OFFICER BRADLEY MERMON, Robinson Township Police; CHIEF DALE 
VIETMEIER, Robinson Township Police; TROOPER ANDREW BRUGGMAN, 
Pennsylvania State Police; ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL, and doctors and 
nurses in my medical record; ROBINSON TOWNSHIP EMS SERVICE; MR. GAGE, 
F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s Case Manager Unit B-2; MS. CATHY LANE, F.C.C. 
Coleman Medium’s Case Manager Coordinator; MR. TRACY DAVIS, F.C.C. Coleman 
Medium’s Counselor Unit B-2; CYNDI SANTIAGO, F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s 
Records Officer; MR. JAMES M. ECKER, Attorney 
 
AARON MICHAEL JONES, 
                                                                 Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-00361) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,  
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 18, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: December 21, 2012) 
 
 
 
  
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2010, Appellant Aaron Michael Jones was the subject of a high speed police 
chase that ended in a collision that killed Jones’ girlfriend and the occupants of another 
vehicle.  According to the state court docket, Jones pleaded guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter and other offenses related to the tragic event.  In 2011, Jones filed a 
complaint and amended complaint against parties involved in the chase and its aftermath, 
including several police officers, his attorney, a hospital, and an emergency medical 
service.
1
  The lawsuit, construed as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged  
false arrest, kidnapping under false pretenses, medical malpractice, violations of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, and various constitutional violations.  Among 
other things, Jones sought $75,000 in damages from each Defendant.  The parties 
consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c)(1), and all but one of the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.  The 
Magistrate Judge granted their motions, and Jones appealed from that order.  Shortly 
thereafter, the remaining Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.  While that motion 
was pending, Jones moved to “withdraw his entire complaint.”  The Magistrate Judge 
granted the motion to withdraw as to the remaining Defendant, and the case was 
subsequently closed. 
                                                 
1
 Although Jones originally named a number of prison employees as defendants, Jones 
  
 Our Clerk ordered Jones to inform this Court of whether he wished to withdraw 
his appeal or, if he wished to proceed, whether the appeal is moot given his desire to  
withdraw the complaint.  Jones responded by asking this Court to hold the appeal in 
abeyance until a decision is rendered on his appeal of the dismissal of his state petition 
for post-conviction relief.  Because this appeal has no merit, we will decline to hold it in 
abeyance; rather, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order granting the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.2 
 We may summarily affirm on any ground supported by the record if the appeal 
does not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6; Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  We exercise plenary review over the 
decision to grant the motions to dismiss.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must view the factual allegations as true and 
dismiss only if the complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 Jones alleged that the two Defendants from the Robinson Township Police 
Department, Officer Mermon and Chief Vietmeier, filed a false complaint against him 
and falsely arrested him when their “initial plan” to apprehend him resulted in the deadly 
                                                                                                                                                             
voluntarily withdrew his claims against them earlier in the litigation. 
2
 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We note that Jones’ notice of appeal 
was premature because it was filed while claims against one Defendant remained 
pending.  The notice of appeal ripened when the District Court granted Jones’ motion to 
withdraw the complaint as to that Defendant.  See Cape May Greene, Inc., v. Warren, 
698 F. 2d 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983). 
  
collision.  He further alleged that Officer Mermon violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
by using deadly force to stop him, and that Chief Vietmeier made a false public statement 
about him.  Jones also made a general allegation that his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights had been violated, that he had been kidnapped under false pretenses, 
and that the Defendants had violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.  The 
Magistrate Judge granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding 
that Jones had failed to allege any facts that would suggest that Defendants Mermon and 
Vietmeier had violated Jones’ constitutional rights or any federal laws.3  We agree. 
 Although Jones apparently based his claims on the chase and collision, the only 
relevant factual allegation made was that a deadly, high speed police pursuit and collision 
occurred.  Jones did not allege how the high speed pursuit started, why he was being 
pursued, what happened during the chase, or how the collision occurred and who was 
involved.  This complete lack of facts regarding the chase and collision renders Jones’ 
pleadings insufficient to raise a claim under the Fourth Amendment that the Defendants 
engaged in the unreasonable use of deadly force, as suggested by Jones’ reference to 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).  Jones similarly failed to allege any facts 
whatsoever about the false public statement he claimed Defendant Vietmeier made, or 
any other facts that would suggest that the Defendants otherwise violated federal law or 
Jones’ constitutional rights. 
 In addition to being unsupported by any facts, the false criminal complaint and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 Defendants Mermon and Vietmeier ostensibly moved to dismiss under Rule 12(e), but  
  
false arrest claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  If a prisoner seeks 
damages in a § 1983 suit, as Jones has done, “the district court must consider whether a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction 
or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”  Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).  Jones’ allegation that the criminal complaint 
against him and his arrest were false implicates the validity of his conviction, but he has 
not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated.  On the contrary, Jones’ 
response to the Clerk’s order indicates that he is still seeking relief from his conviction.  
Accordingly, his false complaint and false arrest   claims were properly dismissed.   
 Jones’ claims against his attorney, Defendant Ecker, are similarly barred under 
Heck.  Jones alleged that his attorney conspired with the prosecution to coerce him into a 
guilty plea.  This allegation, if decided in Jones’ favor, would call his conviction into 
question.  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge appropriately dismissed the complaint as to 
Defendant Ecker. 
 That leaves Jones’ allegations against the emergency medical service team that 
treated the victims at the crash site, Defendant EMS Service, and the hospital where 
Jones was later treated, Defendant Allegheny General Hospital.  Jones alleged that he 
asked the emergency medical team numerous times to treat his girlfriend first.  When told 
that they were concerned that he was armed, Jones handcuffed himself and told the team 
to let him die.  The team, however, pulled Jones from the wreckage first and his girlfriend 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Magistrate Judge properly construed the motion as one made under Rule 12(b)(6). 
  
subsequently died.  That is the extent of Jones’ allegations against Defendant EMS 
Service.  The Magistrate Judge appropriately determined that these allegations are 
insufficient to indicate what federal or constitutional rights were implicated by the 
Defendant’s conduct, let alone that the Defendant violated those rights.   At best, it 
appears that Jones was alleging negligence in the medical treatment of his girlfriend.  He 
does not, however, have standing to bring that claim due to the general prohibition 
against litigating another person’s legal rights.  See Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 
154 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth the requirements of prudential standing). 
 Finally, Jones alleged that he was given improper care for his broken wrist at 
Allegheny General Hospital, that his medical records did not list his injuries or the 
painkillers administered to him, and that his family was misled about visiting him.  As 
with his allegations against Defendant EMS Service, these allegations do not indicate 
what federal laws or constitutional rights Defendant Allegheny General Hospital violated 
and are best construed as medical malpractice claims under state law.  The Magistrate 
Judge declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because all 
of Jones’ claims over which the District Court had original jurisdiction had been 
dismissed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  There was no abuse of discretion in this 
decision.  See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 157-58 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge properly granted the Defendants’ motions 
to dismiss.  There being no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will 
summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
